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An Emerging Norm: The Duty of States
to Provide Reparations for Human
Rights Violations by Non-State Actors
By CECILY ROSE*
The objective of international human rights law is not to punish
those individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather to
protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages
resulting from the acts of the States responsible.1
I. Introduction
While victims of human rights violations have a well-
established right to appropriate reparation, controversy has
continued to surround the corresponding duty to provide those
reparations. 2  The legal basis for the right to reparations is
* B.A. Yale, J.D. Columbia. Many thanks to Viren Mascarenhas for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to the editors of the Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review.
1. Velisquez Rodriguez, Case1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 134
(July 29,1988).
2. Although the issue of reparations for violations of international
humanitarian law is beyond the scope of this article, it is instructive to consider that
the following international human rights treaties include the right to reparations:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 8), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (art. 2(3)), the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 14); the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (art. 39), the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 13), the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights (arts. 7 and 21), and the American Convention on Human
Rights (art. 25). Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A
New Frontier, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 478, 491 (Pablo de Greiff ed. 2008).
See also The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc
A/RES/60/147 ( Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation].
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articulated in numerous international human rights treaties and has
been expanded by regional and international bodies.3 In addition,
the ethical basis for the right to reparations is similarly well-
established.4 In societies transitioning out of periods of political
violence and structural injustice, reparations have helped restore the
dignity of victims and rebuild civil trust and social solidarity.5 Yet,
despite the clearly defined legal and ethical bases for the right to
reparations, disagreement persists on the basic issue of who holds
the corresponding duty to provide reparations for victims of gross
violations of human rights.
In the instances where States or their agents commit gross
human rights violations against those within their territory or
jurisdiction, the answer is fairly straightforward: The State itself is
responsible for providing reparations. 6 Accordingly, reparations
programs have been implemented (to varying degrees) in a series of
Latin American States transitioning out of repressive military
dictatorships, including Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, and El
Salvador.7 In broad strokes, the conflicts in these countries involved
the systematic commission of abuses by the armed forces of the
State, or by paramilitary forces linked to the State.8
As relative peace has settled over Latin America since the end
of the Cold War, a different pattern of conflict has become
increasingly prevalent, particularly in Africa. Many of these more
recent, post-Cold War conflicts have involved the commission of
gross human rights violations by private actors, such as rebel
factions, in developing States where the government is either
3. Id.
4. Marieke Wierda & Pablo de Greiff, Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice,
Reparations and the Int'l Criminal Court: A Prospective Role for the Trust Fund for
Victims 7 (2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/TApproaches/
Prosecutions/ReplCCTrustFund.eng.pdf; Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon,
Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru, 29
HuM. RTS. Q. 228, 231-32 (2007). For a thorough discussion of recognition, civic
trust, and social solidarity, see Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 451 (Pablo de Greiff ed. 2008).
5. Id.
6. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,
G.A. Res. 60/147, 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
7. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 157, 170-72, 174-75 (2004).




unwilling or unable to prevent the commission of violence against
civilians. Conflicts of this nature have taken place over the last two
decades in a number of African countries, including the Democratic
Republic of Congo, northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Rwanda. 9
Following the commission of atrocities by rebel factions in
States like these, many moral, political, and practical considerations
counsel towards the establishment of reparations programs. On a
moral level, reparations programs can contribute to national
reconciliation through the recognition of victims and the restoration
of civic trust and social solidarity.10 The need for reparations
programs is notable in States where the justice system lacks the
capacity to handle criminal prosecutions or civil suits for damages.
Reparations programs can help to provide victims with a degree of
social justice.
In post-conflict States where victims cannot obtain redress
directly from their perpetrators for various political reasons, the
potential for reconciliation may be endangered when governments
fail to step in to provide some form of redress in the place of the
perpetrators. Victims who lack reparations may, for example,
quickly grow to resent the provision of reintegration packages to ex-
combatants.1
On a practical level, victims of atrocities committed by rebel
groups are typically unable to obtain reparations directly from their
perpetrators for a host of reasons. First, many victims simply cannot
identify their perpetrators.12 Second, members of rebel groups are
generally not capable of providing their victims with reparations for
the harm they have caused. They are often impoverished
9. This characterization applies to Rwanda to the extent that the civilian
population, in addition to the military, participated widely in the 1994 Rwandan
genocide. See International Crisis Group, Central Africa Project, available at http://
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1164&l=1; see International Crisis
Group, West Africa Project, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/
index.cfm? id=1170&1=1.
10. Wierda & de Greiff, supra note 4, at 461-66.
11. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 7, at 179 ("[Wlhile reparations for victims languish,
resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants is a priority of those funding and
organizing civil reconstruction. There may be good reasons for this, including
avoiding new conflicts and trying to tamp down the inevitable growth in
criminality, but it also rankles with victims groups who often see their material
circumstances deteriorate as the perpetrators improve.").
12. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 4, at 243.
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themselves and receive some form of reintegration assistance. 13
Moreover, even when warlord rebels do possess large financial
resources, those funds may be stowed away in inaccessible, offshore
bank accounts.14 Finally, judicial systems in post-conflict societies
often do not have the independence, credibility, or capacity
necessary to handle the volume of civil complaints that such
massive violations generate.15
In addition to these moral, political, and practical
considerations, this article argues that an international norm is
emerging whereby States, in certain circumstances, have a legal
duty to provide reparations for violations by non-State actors.
While both conflicting and ambiguous guidance exists on this point,
evidence of such a norm has been emerging from the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights as well as from several truth and
reconciliation commissions.' 6 Some international human rights
treaties provide support for this norm, although they are, for the
most part, somewhat ambiguous on this relatively specific point.17
In addition, during the drafting of the Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation (Basic
Principles), which were adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
2006, States shied away from this subject, preferring to frame the
issue in moral rather than legal terms.'8 The jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, however, provides key
guidance on the obligations of States to ensure respect for human
rights. Moreover, the reports of recent truth and reconciliation
commissions represent striking evidence of an emerging norm of
State responsibility for the provision of reparations for violations by
non-State actors.
13. GULU DISTRICT NGO FORUM & Liu INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, Roco WAT
ACOLI I: RESTORING RELATIONSHIPS IN ACHOLILAND: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO
JUSTICE AND REINTEGRATION 65 (2005).
14. For instance, the former rebel leader and President of Liberia, Charles
Taylor, has allegedly hidden approximately $375 million in revenues removed from
Liberia in New York bank accounts. See Taylor 'Had Billions' in U.S. Bank, BBC, May
2, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7379536.stm.
15. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 7, at 165.
16. Velasquez Rodriguez, at 134; see generally THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMM'N, Witness to Truth, vol. 2 (2004) [hereinafter THE SIERRA
LEONE TRC REPORT]; see generally PERUVIAN TRUTH & RECONCILATION COMM'N,
INFORME FINAL [FINAL REPORT] (2003) [hereinafter PERUVIAN TRC FINAL REPORT].
17. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
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The truth and reconciliation commissions of both Peru and
Sierra Leone recommended that their respective governments
provide reparations for the violations of non-State actors, and both
States have adopted these recommendations. 19 Liberia's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission very recently made similar
recommendations, and a future Ugandan commission may do the
same.20 Although the implementation of the reparations programs
designed by truth and reconciliation commissions is problematic,
these commissions play a noteworthy role in facilitating the
development of international human rights law with respect to
reparations. 21
Part I of this article discusses the provisions on remedies
contained in several international human rights treaties, including
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Part
II explores the Basic Principles, while Part III addresses the Velisquez
Rodriguez case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Part
IV discusses the truth and reconciliation commissions of Peru, Sierra
Leone, and Liberia, and potentially, of Uganda. Finally, Part V
touches upon the International Criminal Court's creation of a
Victims Trust Fund for the provision of reparations.
A. International Human Rights Treaties
International human rights treaties do not provide a clear
answer to the question of whether States are obligated to provide
reparations for the wrongs of non-State actors. The term
"reparations" includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. 22  A range of
international human rights instruments obligates States to provide
individuals with remedies and/or redress when their human rights
19. PERUVIAN TRUTH & REcONCILATION COMM'N, Programa de Reparaciones
[Reparations Program], 143 (2003), available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/
pdf/TOMO%20IX/2.2. %20PIR.pdf [hereinafter PERUVIAN TRC REPARATIONS PRO-
GRAM]; THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 2, ch. 1, at T 21 (2004).
20. THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF LIBERIA, Consolidated Final
Report vol. 2, at 276 available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/reports/final (2009)
[hereinafter THE LIBERIAN TRC FINAL REPORT].
21. Indeed, political problems surrounding the implementation of reparations
programs are not discussed in this article and would be the subject of a separate
article altogether.
22. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation, at 19-23.
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have been violated, though the scope of these obligations can be
unclear. These instruments include article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, article 2(3) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT), and article 39 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.23 Regional human rights treaties also impose such
obligations, including articles 7 and 21 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, article 25 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, and article 13 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 24
Not all of these instruments, however, contain provisions on
redress that would apply to the circumstances in which non-State
actors typically commit violations. Although the CAT contains
strong provisions regarding redress, it does not apply to torture
committed by non-State actors.25 The CAT defines torture as severe
pain or suffering inflicted "by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity."26  Consequently, the CAT does not apply to
situations in which non-State actors have committed acts of torture
without any involvement of the State. In addition, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is inapplicable for our
purposes because of the weakness of its provisions on redress,
which concern only the right of victims to have their cause heard, as
23. Falk, supra note 2, at 491.
24. Id.
25. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-
20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture] (stating in Article 14 that States are to ensure that victims of torture obtain
and have "an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the
means for as full rehabilitation as possible."); see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case
No. IT-99-36, Judgment, 488-489 (Sept. 1, 2004) (finding that "Even though the
[Convention Against Torture] envisages that torture be committed 'with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity, the jurisprudence of this Tribunal does not require that the perpetrator of
the crime of torture be a public official, nor does the torture need to have been
committed in the presence of such an official.").
26. Convention Against Torture, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force June 26, 1987 (emphasis added). On
the subject of torture and non-State actors, see generally THE REDRESS TRUST, NOT





well as property rights regarding wealth and natural resources.27
The following therefore focuses on the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and, by way of contrast, the European Convention on the
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. The Convention on the
Rights of the Child imposes the most minimal obligation upon
States, while the European Convention imposes the strongest and
most explicit obligation to compensate victims. The ICCPR's
provisions are ambiguous, but have been given greater force by the
interpretation provided by the U.N. Human Rights Committee.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains a unique
provision on reparations that is relevant to a number of recent
armed conflicts where the use of child soldiers has been widespread
(e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
northern Uganda).28 Although the Convention does not specifically
refer to reparations or remedies, it does require rehabilitation -a
form of reparation that encompasses medical and psychological care
as well as legal and social services.29 Article 39 of the CRC provides
that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote
physical and psychological recovery and social re-integration of a
child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture
or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and re-integration
shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, peer-
respect and dignity of the child.30
The drafting history of the CRC reveals that States weakened
the language of this provision because they did not want to be
obligated to guarantee the recovery and reintegration of children.
31
27. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7 & 21 (1986).
28. Dominic McGoldrick, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
5 INT'L J. OF LAW AND THE FAMILY 132, 153 (1991) ("This article has no direct
counterpart in international human rights treaties.
29. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation, at 21.
30. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 39, opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
31. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group to the Commission
on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of
2010]
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Article 39 originally required States to take "all appropriate legal,
administrative and other measures to ensure" recovery and
reintegration.32 The drafters, however, changed the word "ensure"
to "enable," and finally from "enable" to merely "promote."33
Article 39 thereby contrasts with other articles of the CRC that
impose a stronger obligation on States to "respect and ensure" the
rights of children.34 In addition, the general term "all measures"
replaced the more specific phrase "legal, administrative and other
measures."3 5 Finally, at the suggestion of the representative of the
United States, the word "appropriate" was inserted in between "all"
and "measures" to qualify the otherwise undue obligation that
would have been placed on States.3 6
While State parties made many reservations to other articles of
the CRC, they did not make reservations to Article 39 because they
likely did not view its obligations as strong enough to warrant any
reservations.3 7 Ultimately, the drafting history clarifies that this
Article does not obligate States to directly provide rehabilitation
services for children who have been victimized by private actors,
such as child-abducting rebel forces. Instead, States must only
"promote" rehabilitation to the extent "appropriate," such as by
supporting the work of non-governmental entities like the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations
Children's Fund.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
By contrast to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
ICCPR explicitly obligates States themselves to provide remedies for
those whose rights have been violated. First, Article 2(1) of the
the Child, 528, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/48 (Mar. 2, 1989). See also Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Legislative History of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child 2, 800-04 (2007); Bo Viktor Nylund, International
Law and the Child Victim of Armed Conflict - Is the 'First Call'for Children? 6 INT'L J.
CHILD RTs. 23, 24-9 (1998).
32. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group to the Commission
on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/28 (Apr. 6, 1988).
33. ECOSOC, supra note 31, at 527-28, 531.
34. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 38, opened for signature
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
35. ECOSOC, supra note 32, at 67
36. Id.
37. Nylund, supra note 31, at 27.
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ICCPR requires States to undertake both "to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind .... "38 State Parties thereby have both an obligation to
"respect" the rights recognized by the ICCPR, as well as a positive
obligation to "ensure" those rights.39 With regard to this positive
obligation, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR requires a State Party to
provide a remedy when it fails to ensure the recognition of the
rights protected by the ICCPR, such as the right to life; the right not
to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; and the right to liberty and security of
person.40
Thus, under the ICCPR, a State's breach of its positive duty to
"ensure" gives rise to an obligation to provide a remedy. States
must specifically undertake:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative
or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted. 41
The first subparagraph of this article suggests a requirement
that State Parties provide an effective remedy to individuals whose
Covenant rights have been violated.42 Effective remedies may take
the form of disciplinary, administrative or criminal proceedings
against a perpetrator. 43  In addition, cessation of an ongoing
38. Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
39. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31].
40. ICCPR art. 7 & 9, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
41. ICCPR art. 2(3), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
42. General Comment No. 31, at 16.
43. Johann Bair, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CML AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
AND ITS (FIRST) OPTIONAL PROTOCOL: A SHORT COMMENTARY BASED ON VIEWS,
20101
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violation may be an essential element of an effective remedy.44
According to the ICCPR's Human Rights Committee, a State's
positive duty to "ensure" requires it to protect individuals not only
against violations committed by its agents, but also against "acts
committed by private persons or entities that would impair the
enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to
application between private persons or entities." 45 States must
therefore address certain activities of private persons or entities so
as to ensure, for example, that they do not inflict torture on others
within their power.46 In certain circumstances, a State's failure to
ensure Covenant rights may give rise to a violation of those rights
by the State, such as when the State permits or fails to "exercise due
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused
by such acts by private persons or entities."47
The point of ambiguity in Article 2(3) is the meaning of
"ensure" and whether it requires a State to guarantee access to a
remedy or to guarantee the provision of the reparation itself. The
Human Rights Committee ("Committee") has equated the
obligation to "ensure an effective remedy" with the obligation to
provide the reparation itself, in certain circumstances. According to
the Committee, Article 2(3) requires that:
... States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant
rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals
whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to
provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of
article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. 48
Reparation may take a range of forms, including "restitution,
rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies,
public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in
relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the
perpetrators of human rights violations." 49
By interpreting the duty to ensure an effective remedy as giving
GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE 7 (2005).
44. General Comment No. 31, at 15.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id.




rise to the duty to provide the reparation itself, the Committee
expanded the scope of Article 2(3) to encompass the scenario at
issue in this article-the provision of reparations by States for the
violations of non-State actors. This interpretation is notable given
that Article 2(3) already provides a certain level of detail on what
the duty to ensure an effective remedy entails (namely, a
determination by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, and the enforcement of such remedies). The
interpretation offered by the Committee implies that, regardless of
the identity of the perpetrator, States may, in certain circumstances,
be held responsible for providing reparations when the State has
failed in its duty to ensure the recognition of those rights. In
circumstances where the perpetrator is a non-State actor, the
Committee's interpretation essentially obligates States to act as a
guarantor by ensuring the provision of reparations when the
perpetrator is indigent or cannot be identified.
3. European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent
Crimes
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR contrasts notably with the provisions
of the 1983 European Convention on the Compensation of Victims
of Violent Crimes (European Convention). The Council of Europe
adopted the European Convention because of the need for
compensation schemes for victims of intentional crimes of violence,
in particular, when the offender has not been identified or is without
resources.50 The European Convention provides that when compen-
sation is "not fully available from other sources" (such as the
perpetrator), the State shall "contribute to compensate those who
have sustained serious bodily injury or impairment of health
directly attributable to an intentional crime of violence," as well as
the dependents of persons who have died as a result of such
crimes.51 In these circumstances, States must award compensation
"even if the offender cannot be prosecuted or punished." 52 The
General Assembly's 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
50. European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes,
open for signature Nov. 24, 1983, Europ. T.S. 116 ("Considering that it is necessary to
introduce or develop schemes for the compensation of these victims by the State in
whose territory such crimes were committed, in particular when the offender has
not been identified or is without resources.
51. Id. at art. 2(1).
52. Id. at art. 2(2).
20~1
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for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985 G.A. Declaration)
also contains very similar language. It provides that States should
compensate victims "when compensation is not fully available from
the offender or other sources." 53
When juxtaposed with the ambiguity of ICCPR Article 2(3), the
provisions of the 1983 European Convention are striking in terms of
the strength and clarity of the obligation they impose on States to
provide reparations for the violations of non-State actors. The
contrast between the provisions in the ICCPR and the provisions in
both the 1983 European Convention and the 1985 G.A. Declaration
may indicate that international law has progressed on this point
since the ICCPR was drafted in the 1960s. It should be noted,
however, that the 1983 European Convention reflects the views of
only one region of the world, and the 1985 G.A. Declaration is not
binding on States. Nonetheless, the European Convention and the
1985 G.A. Declaration show that, in certain circumstances, States
have bound themselves to provide remedies for the violations of
non-State actors.
As will be discussed below, the 1985 G.A. Declaration
contributed to the development of another soft law instrument that
ultimately narrows the obligations of States to provide reparations:
The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law.54
B. The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation
The Basic Principles, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
2005, depart from the stance espoused by States in the 1985 G.A.
Declaration mentioned above. The Basic Principles were developed
by Theo van Boven and Cherif Bassiouni, the Special Rapporteurs
who were respectively appointed by the U.N. Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 55 The
drafting process began in 1989 and culminated in the General
53. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985).
54. Marten Zwanenburg, The Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles: An Appraisal, 24
NETH. Q. Hum. RTs. 641, 643 (2006).
55. Id. at 641-42.
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Assembly's adoption of the Basic Principles in 2006.56 During this
long drafting process, much debate surrounded the issue of "whose
violations are subject to reparations" -violations by the State and its
agents, or violations by non-State actors such as unchecked rebel
factions?57 The debate focused, in part, on whether States should
have to provide reparations even when official involvement cannot
be proven or takes the form of an omission rather than an act.58
The Basic Principles only make a hortatory statement about the
provision of reparations by States for the violations of non-State
actors:
States should endeavour to establish national programmes for
reparation and other assistance to victims in the event that the
parties liable for the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to
meet their obligations. 59
This passage contrasts with the Basic Principles' determination
that States must provide reparations for harm suffered at the hands
of State actors:
... a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or omissions
which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations
of international human rights law or serious violations of
international humanitarian law.60
The Basic Principles made a point of introducing no new legal
obligations by using the terms "shall" and "should" to differentiate,
respectively, between "cases where a binding international norm is
currently in effect," and cases where "an international norm is less
mandatory." 61 In this context, the term "less mandatory" appears to
signal an emerging norm.62
After the adoption of the Basic Principles, Bassiouni
commented that "a State's duty to provide reparations for violations
56. Id. at 642-45.
57. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 7, at 163.
58. Id.
59. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,
at art. 16 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at art. 15 (emphasis added).
61. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Hum. Rights, Civil and
Political Rights: The right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law, 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/63
(Dec. 27,2002) [hereinafter ECOSOC Comm'n on Hum. Rights].
62. Zwanenburg, supra note 54, at 653.
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by non-State actors is best described as an emerging norm," and a
"laudable aspiration."63 During the drafting process, States held
varying views on the responsibility of States and non-State actors for
violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law.
The Guatemalan delegation, for example, considered that "the State
is always responsible for violations, even if the actual perpetrator
cannot be identified." 64  Similarly, the Cuban representative
believed that "violations may be perpetrated by States, their agents,
or others with the tolerance or acquiescence of the State," which is
responsible even when non-State actors are the "actual
perpetrators." 65  By contrast, the representative of the United
Kingdom believed that non-State actors could not even violate
human rights law (only States can do so), although both States and
non-State actors could violate international humanitarian law.66 In
response to these varying view points, Special Rapporteur van
Boven noted that because the Basic Principles are not a treaty, they
may reflect an evolving concept of State responsibility under human
rights law.67
Ultimately, while focusing on victims' rights, the Basic
Principles avoided the controversial matter of who bears
responsibility for providing reparations. 68 The drafters were only
able to reach agreement on the notion that "the right to reparation
applies both to violations of human rights and violations of
63. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victim's Rights, 6 HuM. RTs.
L. REv. 203, 223 (2006).
64. ECOSOC Comm'n on Hum. Rights, supra note 61, at 115.
65. Id. at 119.
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id. at 38.
68. It should be noted, however, that, in accordance with the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the Basic Principles do carve
out limited spheres in which States may be held liable for the wrongs of non-State
actors. Non-State actors that become State actors "are responsible for their policies
and practices." When non-State actors transform themselves into the government
by assuming power, it would be incongruous to deny their victims the rights and
remedies available to other victims. Also, when non-State actors assume effective
control over a territory equivalent to the control exercised by States, then "there is
no legal reason why such non-State actors would be excluded either from
responsibility for their actions or for the consequences of their policies and practice
with respect to victims ... " U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on
Hum. Rights, The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Explanatory Comments, p. 27-28,
E/CN.4/2004/57 (Nov. 10, 2003).
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humanitarian law, regardless of the status of the perpetrator or of
succession of Governments." 69 In seeking "to ensure that victims
receive remedy and reparation, regardless of who is the principal
violator," the Basic Principles deemphasize the question of whether
States or non-State actors are responsible for violations. The Basic
Principles instead focus on the "situation of the victim." 70 During
the latter stages of the drafting process, Special Rapporteur
Bassiouni stressed that the Basic Principles aimed not "to establish
principles of State responsibility, but to provide guidance on
whether there are obligations to provide reparations as a
consequence of violations."71 Thus, instead of addressing who
possesses these obligations, the Basic Principles contain only a
"weak exhortation to States, but no obligation" in cases where the
responsible party is unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligation to
provide reparations. 72
Furthermore, although the Basic Principles recognize victims'
rights, they base them in part on moral obligations - on social
principles of "solidarity with victims" as well as on "legal principles
of accountability." 73 While the Basic Principles do not address the
meaning of the term social solidarity, it has been described, on a
most basic level, as "an interest in the interests of others." 74
According to one commentator, "[iun societies divided and stratified
by the differences between the urban and the rural, by ethnic,
cultural, class, and gender factors, reparations manifest the interest
of the traditionally most advantaged in the interests of the least
favored."75 Ideally, a carefully designed and well-implemented
reparations program has the potential to play a modest role in
catalyzing social solidarity in transitional societies.76
According to the drafting history of the Basic Principles, the
concept of social solidarity was meant to extend the protection of
victims' rights "beyond cases where the perpetrator could be held
69. ECOSOC Comm'n on Hum. Rights, supra note 61, at 47.
70. Id. at 114.
71. Id. at 116.
72. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 7, at 164.
73. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation,
preamble.
74. Wierda & de Greiff, supra note 4, at 464.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 465.
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accountable by calling on the Government concerned to support
victims directly, even if it was not at fault." 77 The Basic Principles'
use of the concept of "social solidarity" thereby reflects the fact that
the drafters did not intend to make States legally responsible for the
policies and practices of non-State actors. Instead, victims of
violations by private actors may seek redress only on the basis of
social solidarity. The concept of social solidarity thereby brings the
issue of responsibility into the realm of politics and policymaking,
and highlights the reluctance of States to extend their liability in this
manner.
Ultimately, the Basic Principles' focus on social solidarity and
the rights of victims undermines the ability of victims to enforce
their right to reparations. By merely acknowledging that legal
obligations exist, without defining and assigning those obligations,
the Basic Principles render the rights of victims somewhat
meaningless. The relatively long-term goal of social solidarity is
quite distinct from concrete legal principles of accountability - only
the latter may form the basis of a legal duty to provide reparations.
The weakness of the Basic Principles on the issue of reparations for
violations of non-State actors reflects a critical lack of consensus
among States on this issue. As the following demonstrates,
however, not all States and international institutions have shied
away from asserting a strong stance on this subject.
C. Inter-American Case Law: Velfisquez Rodriguez
Unlike the Basic Principles, the case law of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) has both recognized
the rights of victims to reparations and identified corresponding
obligations of the State. The Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights (Inter-American Convention), like the ICCPR, obligates State
Parties "to undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized" in the Convention, and "to ensure to all persons subject
to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discrimination ...."78 The Inter-American
Convention also largely mirrors the provisions of the ICCPR
regarding the right to judicial protection, although the Inter-
American Convention does not explicitly obligate States to "ensure"
77. ECOSOC Comm'n on Hum. Rights, supra note 61, at 13.




that victims have an "effective remedy." 79  Instead, the Inter-
American Convention focuses on the right of the victim to "effective
recourse" to a court or tribunal:
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any
other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by
this Convention, even though such violation may have been
committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.80
Although the Inter-American Convention does not, like the
ICCPR, obligate states to ensure or guarantee effective remedies or
recourse, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court has
nevertheless imposed such an obligation. Like the ICCPR's Human
Rights Committee, the Inter-American Court has found that certain
duties stem from the obligation of States to "ensure" the free and
full exercise of the rights recognized under the Inter-American
Convention. As will be discussed below, the Court has explicitly
linked the State's obligation to ensure human rights with its duty to
provide recourse in the event of their violation.
In 1988, in the landmark Veldsquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights articulated a cogent theory of due
diligence owed by States in the context of forced disappearances. 8'
The Inter-American Court considered the phenomenon of forced
79. Id. at art. 25(2) (stating that "States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any
person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the state; (b) to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) to ensure that the competent authorities
shall enforce such remedies when granted.").
80. Id. at art. 25. In addition, Article 10 provides for a relatively narrow right to
compensation: "Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with
the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a
miscarriage of justice." As noted by one commentator, this provision "seems to
refer exclusively to improper behavior of the state associated with criminal
prosecution and punishment within the judicial system." FALK, supra note 2, at 484.
Article 63(1) of the Convention is also worthy of mention:
[i]f the [Inter-American] Court finds that there has been a violation of a
right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the
injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was
violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom
be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.
81. Arthur J. Carrillo, The Relevance of the Inter-American Human Rights Law and
Practice to Repairing the Past, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONs, 504, 506 (Pablo de
Greiff ed., 2008).
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disappearances to be a continuous violation of many human rights
that States are obligated to respect and guarantee.8 2 The Inter-
American Court observed that although "disappearances are not
new in the history of human rights violations," their systemic and
repeated use in Latin America to create a "general state of anguish,
insecurity and fear, is a recent phenomenon." 83
The Veldsquez Rodriguez case concerned the disappearance of
Manfredo VelAsquez in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in 1981.84
Manfredo Veldsquez was a student involved in activities that the
Honduran authorities considered "dangerous" to national
security.8 5 The Court found that several heavily armed men, who
were connected with, or under the control of, the Honduran Armed
Forces, had carried out Manfredo Veldsquez kidnapping. The Court
further determined that his captors and the Armed Forces had
denied the kidnapping.86 In addition, the Armed Forces and the
Honduran Government had failed to investigate and reveal the
whereabouts of Manfredo Veldsquez.8 7 Three writs of habeas
corpus and two criminal complaints had been brought before the
courts of Honduras, but all had proven ineffective. 88
The Inter-American Court held that Manfredo Velasquez had
disappeared at the hands of, or with the acquiescence of, Honduran
officials. 89 More broadly, the Court also found that the Honduran
Government had failed to guarantee the human rights affected by
the practice of disappearances. 90 In particular, the disappearance of
Manfredo Velasquez violated his right to personal liberty (art. 7), his
right to personal integrity (art. 5), and his right to life (art. 4).91 The
82. Veldsquez Rodriguez, at 134.
83. Id. at 149.
84. For background information on the case of Veldsquez Rodriguez see Linda
Drucker, Recent Development: Government Liability for 'Disappearances': A Landmark
Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 289 (1988).
For an analysis of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on State
responsibility see Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the
Responsibility of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1989).
85. Veldsquez Rodriguez, at 147(g)(i).
86. Id. at 147 (g)(iii).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 148.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 155-57.
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Inter-American Court noted that even if it had not found that agents
acting under cover of public authority had carried out the
disappearance of Manfredo Veldsquez, the Honduran Government
still would have failed to ensure his free and full exercise of human
rights, according to the duties it assumed under the Inter-American
Convention.92
On a more theoretical level, the Court further held that States
can be found responsible for the infringement of human rights not
because of their direct involvement in violations, but because of a
lack of due diligence. The Court explained that in certain
circumstances a State is obligated to prevent, investigate, and
punish human rights violations:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially
not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act
of a private person or because the person responsible has not been
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the
Convention.93
The Court emphasized that due diligence requires a State to
prevent, investigate, and punish human rights violations, as well as
ensure adequate compensation. The Court explained that a State
party must "take reasonable steps to prevent human rights
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious
investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction to
identify those responsible." 94 States therefore have a duty "to
organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the
structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are
capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human
rights."95  In addition, States are required "to impose the
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate
compensation."96
Significantly, the Court added that States must, "if possible
attempt to restore the right and provide compensation as warranted
92. Id. at 182.
93. Id. at 172.
94. Id. at 174.
95. Id. at 166.
96. Id. at 174.
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for damages resulting from the violation."97 This passage represents
the first judicial articulation of the State's obligation, in certain
circumstances, to provide reparations to the victims of human rights
abuses committed by non-State or otherwise unidentifiable actors.98
Although the Court did not specify when a State would be obligated
to provide compensation, this passage could logically be interpreted
to mean that a duty attaches when the perpetrators are unknown or
unable to provide compensation themselves. Furthermore, the
phrase "if possible" could imply that States would not be obligated
to act if practical considerations, such as a State's budgetary
constraints, precluded such a payment. Such a caveat potentially
creates a significant exception to this obligation, as even a political
impasse, for instance, could be considered a practical consideration
that renders compensation impossible.
Ultimately, the Court in the Veldsquez Rodriguez case called
upon the parties to agree on the amount of compensation or
damages, but indicated that it would award an amount if the parties
were unable to reach an agreement.99 As the above passages
indicate, even if the disappearance of Manfredo Veldsquez had not
been directly imputed to Honduras, the State still would have been
responsible for ensuring adequate compensation due to its failure to
prevent, investigate, and punish. Moreover, if the perpetrators had
been unidentifiable or without monetary assets, then this duty to
ensure would have required Honduras to provide compensation, "if
possible."100
Overall, the Court's 1988 judgment in the Veldsquez Rodriguez
case had "an enormous impact on the processes of political
transformation ongoing in various Latin American countries" at that
time.1°1 The reparations programs adopted in both Chile and
Argentina in the early 1990s internalized the principle of due
diligence articulated in the Veldsquez Rodriguez case and reflected the
legal pressure imposed by the Inter-American human rights
system.102 The influence of this case, however, has extended well
beyond Latin America in the 1990s. As will be discussed in the
97. Id. at 166.
98. Carrillo, supra note 81, at 511.
99. VelAsquez Rodriguez, at 191.
100. Id. at 166.




following sections, the Veldsquez Rodriguez case formed an important
legal basis for the recommendations on reparations made by the
truth commissions of Peru and Sierra Leone.
D. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
Truth and reconciliation commissions in post-conflict States
such as Peru and Sierra Leone have adopted the principles
articulated in the Veldsquez Rodriguez case by explicitly obligating
States to make reparations for violations of human rights committed
by non-State actors. Despite the acceptance by States of this
obligation, however, the implementation of recommended
reparations programs has not been forthcoming. This trend may
point to the weakness or unenforceability of such a norm, or the
degree to which it is still emerging. The following sections discuss
the reports issued by the commissions in Peru, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia, and then examine the possible creation of a commission for
northern Uganda.
1. Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In 2001, Peru's interim government established a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate the human rights
violations that were committed during the internal armed conflict
that occurred in Peru between 1980 and 2000.103 The conflict
between guerilla groups, the rondas campesinas (armed peasant
patrols), and the Peruvian armed forces began in 1980, when Peru's
Communist Party, the Shining Path, began its campaign to
overthrow the Peruvian state.104 After President Alberto Fujimori
was forced from office in 2000, interim-President Valentin Paniagua
used the past conflict as a political opening to establish the
Commission. 105 During its two-year investigation from 2001 to 2003,
the Comnmission determined that approximately 69,280 people had
been killed or disappeared during the conflict.10 6 The Commission
also found that the Shining Path was responsible for 54 percent of
the deaths and disappearances reported to the TRC, while the
103. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 4, at 232-33.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. PERUVIAN TRC FINAL REPORT, vol. 8, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.
cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%201X/2.2. % 20PIR.pdf.
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armed forces were responsible for 37 percent1 07
Peru's TRC designed a Program of Integral Reparations
(Programa de Integral Reparaciones) to help promote peace and foster
conditions for reconciliation. 08 The TRC called for a comprehensive
reparations program which would include symbolic reparations,
health and educational services, the restitution of citizen rights,
individual economic reparations, and collective community
reparations.109  The TRC also defined "victims" in a notably
comprehensive manner.110 The Commission defined victims as "all
those people or groups of people who ... lived in the country
between May 1980 and November 2000, [and who] have suffered
acts or omissions that violated norms of international human rights
law.""' This definition conspicuously omits any reference to the
status of the perpetrator of the violation. The TRC also explained
that the term "victim of violation" refers to victims of a wide range
of conduct, including forced disappearance, abduction, extrajudicial
killings, murder, forced displacement, arbitrary detention and
violations of due process, forced recruitment, torture, and sexual
violations.1 2  The Commission emphasized that a person's
classification as a "victim of a violation" "does not depend on who
the author was or on who has been identified as the author of the
violations .... "113
The Commission based its recommendations for the reparations
program on legal as well as moral justifications. Like the Basic
Principles, the TRC's Report emphasizes the importance of
solidarity with victims of the armed conflict. The Commission
found that although the damage caused by the conflict is
immeasurable, reparations play a role in acknowledging and
reaffirming the dignity and the status of Peruvian citizens." 4 The
Commission explained that the State has a moral duty to provide
victims and their relatives with tangible signs of support and help,
which, along with the application of justice, will foster a better
107. Id. at 5-7.
108. PERUVIAN TRC REPARATIONS PROGRAM, at 139.
109. Id. at 159-202.
110. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 4, at 234.
111. PERUVIAN TRC REPARATIONS PROGRAM, at 149.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 149-50.
114. Id. at 141.
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understanding by Peruvian society of the country's different
ethnicities and cultures. 115 For Peruvian victims who view the State
as having failed to protect them, reparations also serve an important
symbolic role by acknowledging their suffering, and signaling the
State's accountability, or assumption of responsibility for the
wrongs done to them." 6
Unlike the Basic Principles, however, the Commission also
considered the State to be legally, as well as ethically, obligated to
provide reparations. By framing the provision of reparations as a
legal obligation, the Commission strengthened the right of victims
to such reparations. The fulfillment of this right would otherwise be
left to the discretion of the State as it makes decisions regarding the
allocation of funds.117 Like the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the Commission explained that a State's primary obligation
to respect and ensure respect for human rights gives rise to a "duty
to guarantee," meaning an obligation to prevent, investigate, and
punish, and a duty to provide reparations to victims.11 8 The
Commission further noted that these obligations of the State
correspond to the rights of people, and groups of people, to obtain
reparations, as stipulated in various international legal
instruments. 1 9
In light of these moral and legal obligations, the Commission
found the Peruvian Government responsible for providing
reparations for victims of violations by non-State actors. This
finding was critical for the efficacy of the reparations program,
given that the TRC found that non-State actors (the Shining Path)
had committed the majority (54%) of violations during the armed
conflict. 20  Drawing upon the Veldsquez Rodriguez case, the
Commission emphasized that although violations by non-State
actors may not initially be imputable to a State (because, for
example, the perpetrator cannot be identified), a State may incur
responsibility on account of its lack of due diligence in preventing
the violation.121 The Commission therefore found that a State's duty
115. Id. at 141-42.
116. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 4, at 245.
117. Id. at 246.
118. PERUVIAN TRC REPARATIONS PROGRAM, at 142.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 109.
121. Id. at 143.
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to provide reparations extends to violations of human rights
committed by private actors, including subversive groups and
terrorists.122 Consequently, the Commission recommended equal
treatment for all victims-both for those whose rights have been
violated by State agents, as well as for those victimized by
subversive groups and terrorists. 123
However, the Peruvian government's slow and inadequate
implementation of the TRC's recommendations on reparations has
generated a high level of disappointment in Peru among victims
and survivors.124 Although the Commission issued its report in
August 2003, implementation of its recommendations did not begin
until nearly two years later. In April 2005, a special government-
appointed commission produced a Plan of Reparations, based on
the Commission's recommendations, and in July 2005, the Peruvian
Congress approved a Law of Reparations.125 The National Council
for Reparation, a government task force that was created in 2006,
then registered for reparations 9,900 people in 3,565 communities.126
In 2007, the Government finally paid approximately $2 million to
only 65 communities, and a similarly inadequate amount of money
was budgeted for 2008.127 Greater progress has been thwarted by
the limited budget of the task force, the lack of coordination
between government agencies, and a lack of technical assistance to
the communities in receipt of reparations. 128
2. Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The conclusions reached by the Peruvian TRC in 2003 formed
an important basis for the recommendations made the following
year by the Sierra Leonean Commission. During the decade-long
armed conflict in Sierra Leone, multiple armed factions vied for
control of the country and engaged in brutal and widespread
violence against the civilian population.129 The armed conflict,
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 4, at 241.
125. Id. at 241, 246-47.
126. Barbara J. Fraser, Work Remains in Struggle to Repair Human Rights Violations




129. See Priscilla Hayner, The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
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which began in 1991 and persisted until early 2002, was
characterized in particular by amputations, the use of child soldiers,
and sexual violence against women. 30 The Lom6 Agreement of
1999 called for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation
commission and provided a blanket amnesty for the acts of all
combatants and collaborators up until the signing of the
agreement. 131 In February 2000, the Sierra Leonean Parliament
passed the Truth and Reconciliation Act (Sierra Leonean TRC Act),
but after the fighting renewed in May 2000, the creation of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission was delayed until later that year.132
The Lom6 Agreement and the Sierra Leonean TRC Act
obligated the government of Sierra Leone to design and implement
a Special Fund for War Victims. 133 The Sierra Leonean TRC Act also
authorized the Commission to provide information and
recommendations to this Fund, although it did not permit the
Commission to exercise control over the Fund's operations or
disbursement. 34 The Commission's report, issued in November
2004, accordingly provided detailed recommendations concerning
eligible beneficiaries, the provision of benefits (e.g., health care,
pensions, education, skills-training and micro-credit/projects, and
community and symbolic reparations), sources of funding, and the
implementation of policy.
135
The Commission also addressed the international legal basis for
the Sierra Leonean Government's provision of reparations. In doing
so, the Commission followed in the footsteps of the Peruvian TRC
by declaring that the government of Sierra Leone was obligated to
provide reparations for the violations committed not only by the
Sierra Leonean Government, but also by non-State actors during the
armed conflict. The Commission took the view that:
Reviewing the First Year, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. Jan. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/100.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Peace Agreement, July 7, 1999, Sierra Leone-Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) art. 26, 1 & art. 9, 2, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter Lom Agreement].
132. THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 1, ch. 2, at 7.
133. Lom6 Agreement, at art. 29.
134. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act art. 7(6) (2000) (Sierra Leone),
available at http://www.b92.net/ trr/eng/doc/sierraleone-mandate.doc [herein-
after Sierra Leone TRC Act].
135. THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 2, ch. 4, at 100.
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...the State has a legal obligation to provide reparations for
violations committed by both state actors and private actors. The
Commission is of the opinion that all victims should be treated
equally, fairly, and justly. Given the nature of the conflict in
Sierra Leone, it was not always possible to identify the
perpetrators or the group they belonged to. States have the
obligation to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and to
ensure that human rights violators are brought to justice and that
reparations are made to victims. States do not only have an
obligation to respect human rights themselves; they are also
obliged to ensure compliance with international obligations by
private persons and an obligation to prevent violations. If
governments fail to apply due diligence in responding adequately
to, or in structurally preventing human rights violations, they are
legally and morally responsible. 136
In support of this pronouncement, the Report referenced the
Veldsquez Rodriguez case as well as the Report of the Peruvian
TRC.137 The Report also noted that several international human
rights instruments impose on States the duty to provide individuals
with "an effective remedy," "effective protection and remedies," or
"redress and an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation. " 138 In addition, the Report generally referenced the
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and
Reparations.139 One of the Commissioners of the TRC, William
Schabas, separately opined that the Commission's views on the
State's duty to provide reparations were in keeping with the
progressive vision of the Basic Principles.140
Like the sources it references, the Commission explicitly found
that in certain circumstances, the State has a legal obligation to
provide reparations for violations by private non-State actors, as
well as by the State. The Commission seems to have implicitly
136. Id. at 21.
137. Id.
138. THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 2, ch. 4, at T 17. Examples include the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 8), International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (art. 2.3), Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 14), and the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights (arts. 7, 21).
139. THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 2, ch. 4, at 18-21.
140. William A. Schabas, Reparation Practices in Sierra Leone and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Out of the Ashes, REPARATION FOR VIcTIMS OF GROSS AND
SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 289, 298-99 (K. De. Feyter et al. eds., 2005).
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recognized that without such an obligation on the State, few victims
would qualify for reparations due to the nature of the armed
conflict. The Sierra Leonean Armed Forces were ultimately
responsible for a relatively small proportion of the violations against
civilians. Furthermore, the more culpable armed factions (including
the Revolutionary United Front, the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council, and the Civil Defense Forces) were at times difficult to
differentiate between one another, while the individual perpetrators
were similarly difficult to identify.141  These extenuating
circumstances seem to have necessitated the Commission's
examination of the basis on which the State may be obligated to
provide reparations for all victims, regardless of the status of the
perpetrator.
The significance of the Commission's statement has been
diminished by the Sierra Leonean Government's failure to
implement the Report's recommendations. The Sierra Leonean TRC
Act requires the Government of Sierra Leone to implement the
Commission's recommendations in a timely and faithful manner.
142
Yet, as of this writing, few significant steps have been taken towards
implementation. 143 In its November 2004 Report, the Commission
recommended that Sierra Leone's National Commission for Social
Action (NaCSA) handle the implementation of the reparations
program, in part because of the organization's prior experience in
dealing with the devastation caused by the conflict.'" Not until
June 2005, however, did the Government of Sierra Leone issue a
White Paper accepting "in principle" the findings and
recommendations of the Commission regarding reparations. 145 In
addition, the White Paper quickly qualified this statement by
explaining that it would use its "best endeavours to ensure the full
and timely implementation" of the reparations programs
recommended by the Commission, subject to available resources,
including assistance received from the international community.
146
141. THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 2, ch. 4, at 21.
142. Sierra Leone TRC Act, at art. 17.
143. See generally NAT'L COMM'N FOR SOCIAL ACTION (2007), available at
http://www.nacsasl.org.
144. THE SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT vol. 2, ch. 4, at 210-14.
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In 2007, the Government of Sierra Leone finally designated
NaCSA as the implementing body of the reparations program.147
Thus, five years after the conclusion of Sierra Leone's decade-long
armed conflict, the government of Sierra Leone was just beginning
to implement a reparations program, which was originally
conceived of in the 1999 Lom6 Peace Agreement. This prolonged
delay highlights the difficulties involved in implementing a
reparations program in a post-conflict setting, given problems
concerning adequate and sustained funding, as well as sufficient
political will. Although the Government's acceptance of the
Commission's findings contributes to opinio juris on the extent of
State responsibility for the provision of reparations, little State
practice (in the form of implementation) has followed. The absence
of any State practice could suggest that the Government's
acceptance of responsibility in the first instance was not entirely in
good faith. It could also point to the weakness of this legal norm in
light of the fact that transitional governments often have a limited
capacity to implement such programs.
3. Subsequent Truth Commissions
Since 2004, no other truth and reconciliation commission has
declared in similarly explicit terms that States are responsible for
providing reparations for violations committed by non-State actors.
The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission has, however,
designed a reparations program following a conflict in which rebel
groups committed widespread atrocities against the civilian
population over the course of Liberia's 15-year civil war. In
addition, the Ugandan government has been exploring the
possibility of creating a truth commission that would have the
capacity to recommend reparations for victims of atrocities
committed by the Lord's Resistance Army in the northern regions of
Uganda.
a. Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The Liberian civil war, which took the lives of 200,000 Liberians
and displaced one million people, was originally sparked in 1989
147. INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., SIERRA LEONE, BACKGROUND, available at
http://icqj.org/en/where/region1/141.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). The
International Center for Transitional Justice has since been involved in training
NaCSA officials and other members of civil society.
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with the invasion of the armed group, the National Patriotic Front,
under the leadership of Charles Taylor, who would later become the
president of Liberia.148 Throughout the course of the civil war,
atrocities were committed against civilians by a relatively large and
complex array of rebel factions, as well as by the Liberian military
(the Armed Forces of Liberia).149 Liberia's civil war ended with the
signing of its Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on August 18,
2003 in Accra, Ghana.150 This agreement was, by some accounts,
Liberia's fifteenth peace agreement since the country's civil war
began in 1989.151 The negotiations leading up to this agreement took
place in Ghana over the course of 76 days, while warring factions
continued to shell Monrovia, Liberia's capital.152 In addition to
establishing a truth commission and a two-year transitional
government, the CPA called for reform of the judicial and security
sectors.1 53
The CPA itself did not call for reparations, although Liberia's
Truth and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (Liberian TRC Act) later did.154
The provision in the CPA that provided for the establishment of a
TRC only called upon the Commission to make recommendations
regarding rehabilitation rather than reparations, more broadly.155
Apparently the participants in the peace negotiations never
148. See generally Peter Dennis, A Brief History of Liberia, INT'L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (May 2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/
Liberia/BriefHistory.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and
the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Aug. 18, 2003 available at
http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/ecowas/liberiapeace.pdf
[hereinafter Comprehensive Peace Agreement].
151. Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for
Justice, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., Nov., 2007, available at http://www. ictj.
org/static/Africa/Liberia/HaynerLiberial207.eng.pdf.
152. Id. at 4, 11-14.
153. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, at art. XIII.
154. Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act authorizes the
Commission to make recommendations regarding "[rieparations and rehabilitation
of victims and perpetrators in need of specialized psychosocial and other
rehabilitative services." THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION ACT OF LIBERIA art. 7 §
26(j)(i) (2005) available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/reports/final (2009)
[hereinafter TRC ACT OF LIBERIA].
155. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, at art. XIII § 3.
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seriously discussed the subject of reparations. 5 6 Some international
participants briefly considered the possibility, but decided that it
would be too costly; their assumption was that reparations could
not realistically be undertaken because everyone in Liberia is a
victim of the conflict.
157
The Liberian TRC Act, however, does provide for reparations,
as well as for a trust fund, and official recognition of those who died
in the conflict. 5 8  In its June 2009 Final Report, the Liberian
Commission accordingly made a series of recommendations, though
they lack a crucial level of detail, especially by comparison to the
recommendations of other commissions. 5 9 For individuals who
were incapacitated as a consequence of the civil war, the
Commission recommended reparations in the form of psychosocial,
physical, and mental health services. 160 In addition, the Commission
recommended the provision of cash or material assistance to
victims, though the parameters of this recommendation are
unclear.161 The Commission also recommended an adequately
resourced trust fund, the establishment of memorials in recognition
of the dead and the survivors of the conflict, and the provision of
reparations for particular groups (such as education for children
and special programs for the empowerment of women).
162
Although the Commission does not explicitly discuss which victims
will be eligible for reparations, the assumption appears to be that
victims of violations committed by both State and non-State actors
will be beneficiaries.
Compared to the Peruvian and Sierra Leonean TRCs, Liberia's
Commission offers little discussion of the moral or legal support for
its recommendations. The Liberian TRC simply recommended "that
the Government of Liberia assume its full responsibility under
international law principles and regimes and pursuant to its moral,
legal, social, political, cultural, economic, and security obligations to
its citizens to provide reparations for all those individuals and
156. Hayner, supra note 151, at 20.
157. Id.
158. TRC AcT OF LIBERIA, at art. 4, 7 § 26(j)(i), art. 8 § 29, art. 9 § 38.
159. See generally THE LIBERIAN TRC FINAL REPORT, at vol. 2.
160. Id. at 378.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 378-79.
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communities victimized by the years of instability and war." 163 The
Liberian TRC's brief treatment of the issue could suggest that the
Commission perceived that the legal basis for reparations for
violations of non-State actors was already sufficiently well-
established, and therefore not worthy of serious attention. On the
other hand, the terseness of this passage could suggest that the
Commission did not give these issues the type of careful
consideration that the Commissions of Peru and Sierra Leone
devoted. Given the overall brevity and lack of specificity of the
Report's section on reparations, successful and timely
implementation of the recommendations may be an unlikely
outcome.
b. Uganda's Juba Peace Agreement
Reparations have also been a feature of the Juba peace process
that has been aimed at bringing sustainable peace to northern
Uganda after 23 years of conflict and internal displacement. Unlike
the reparations programs discussed above, however, the agreements
stemming from this peace process take into consideration the
likelihood that decisions by the Ugandan Government on resource
allocation could impact the design of any reparations program.164 In
addition, these agreements also allow for the perpetrators to be held
responsible for providing reparations; however this is an unlikely
outcome in practice due to the general impoverishment of the Lord
Resistance Army's members (LRA).
165
The Juba peace process, which began in June 2006, has been
working toward bringing closure to the conflict in northern Uganda,
which involved the commission of atrocities by the LRA, and also,
to a lesser extent, by the Ugandan military (the Ugandan People's
Defense Force).166 Over one million internally displaced people
have returned to their areas of origin since the cessation of hostilities
163. Id. at 378.
164. See, e.g., The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the
Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement, Uganda-
Sudan, June 29, 2007, available at http://northemuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/
images/u-h8S9SwfKutKGw7OeM4vw/agendaitem3296.pdf.
165. Id.
166. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BENCHMARKS FOR ASSESSING POSSIBLE NATIONAL
ALTERNATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES AGAINST ERA LEADERS:
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH'S FIRST MEMORANDUM ON JUSTICE ISSUES AND THE JUBA TALKS,
2 (May 2007).
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agreement and a permanent ceasefire were signed in February
2008.167 Although the conflict in northern Uganda has effectively
ended, the LRA has moved on to neighboring regions of southern
Sudan and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).168 In
addition, the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony, has refused to sign the
Final Peace Agreement that would bring the Juba peace process to a
successful conclusion. 169  Nevertheless, despite the LRA's
resumption of attacks in Sudan and the DRC and the peace talk's
apparent failure, the Government of Uganda has already begun to
implement parts of the concluded Juba protocols.170
The June 2007 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
(Agreement), and its February 2008 Annex, obligate the Ugandan
Government to establish a body with truth commission-like powers,
which would analyze the history of the conflict, inquire into its
manifestations, hold hearings, promote truth-telling, preserve
memory of the conflict, and gather information on the
disappeared.171 This body would also have the power to "make
recommendations for the most appropriate modalities for
implementing a regime of reparations, taking into account the
principles set out in the principal agreement." 172 The parties agreed
that "collective as well as individual reparations should be made to
victims through mechanisms to be adopted by the Parties upon
further consideration." 7 3 In keeping with the Basic Principles, the
Agreement specifies that such reparations may take the form of
rehabilitation, restitution, compensation, guarantees of non-
recurrence, and other symbolic measures, including apologies,
memorials, and comrnemorations 7 4
Unlike the other reparations programs discussed above, the
167. INTERNATIONAL CRIsis GROUP, NORTHERN UGANDA: THE ROAD TO PEACE,
WITH OR WITHOUT KONY 1, 7 (2008).
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1, 4.
171. Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between
the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement, Feb. 19,
2008, art. 4, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Annexure to_
agreementon Accountability-signedtoday.pdf [hereinafter Annexure to the
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation].
172. Id. at 40).
173. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, at 9.2.
174. Id. at 9.1.
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Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation allows for the
possibility that the rebels themselves could be held responsible for
providing reparations to their victims. The Agreement calls for
legislation that would establish a regime of "alternative penalties
and sanctions" for serious crimes and human rights violations
committed by non-State actors during the conflict. 7 5 This legislation
would require perpetrators to provide reparations to victims. 176 The
Agreement, however, is not clear on whether perpetrators
themselves would be responsible for directly providing reparations.
The Agreement states that reparations that are ordered to be paid to
a victim as a result of "penalties and sanctions in accountability
proceedings, may be paid out of resources identified for this
purpose."17 7 Based on the text of the Agreement, the nature of those
resources is unclear.
In addition, the reparations scheme outlined in the February
2008 Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation (Annex) is unusual because it would not ensure the
independence of any reparations program recommended by a truth
commission.178 According to the Annex, prior to establishing a
reparations program, the government must "review the financial
and institutional requirements for reparations, in order to ensure the
adoption of the most effective mechanisms for reparations." 179 This
focus on "financial and institutional requirements" suggests that a
reparations program would not likely be designed according to
victims' needs, but instead according to the Government's decisions
on resource allocation.180 As of this writing, however, given that a
truth commission has yet to come into being in northern Uganda,
the exact contours of or limitations on any reparations program
remains to be seen.
E. International Criminal Court
Although the reparations scheme of the International Criminal
175. Id. at 6.3.
176. Id. at 6.4.
177. Id. at . 9.3 (emphasis added).
178. Amnesty International, Uganda: Agreement and Annex on Accountability and
Reconciliation Falls Short of a Comprehensive Plan to end Impunity , Mar. 1, 2008, AFR
59/001/2008, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4847a4872.
html [accessed Feb. 21, 2010].
179. Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 16-17.
180. Amnesty International, supra note 178, at 23.
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Court (ICC) does not directly contribute to the development of State
responsibility for reparations, the ICC's use of its trust fund may
serve as an example of how reparations may be provided by an
entity other than the perpetrator. The ICC is the first international
court with the power to order reparations directly against
individual perpetrators.181 The reparations scheme embodied in the
Rome Statute was part of a more general effort by the drafters to
grant victims broad abilities to participate in proceedings before the
ICC.182 The provisions on reparations were also part of an attempt
to effectively address the issue of reparations, in light of the fact that
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were not able to make use of the compensation schemes in
their statutes. 8
3
Although the Rome Statute does not include any provisions on
State responsibility, it does recognize that reparations may be
provided by sources other than the perpetrator. 184 The concept of
State responsibility for reparations was a contentious issue during
the negotiations on reparations at the 1998 Rome Conference for the
International Criminal Court.185 Perhaps the debates on this issue at
the Rome Conference foreshadowed its contentiousness a few years
later during the latter stages of the drafting of the Basic Principles.
A significant number of delegations were not prepared to accept the
principle of State responsibility towards victims, and they likely
would have opposed the article on reparations in its entirety had it
included provisions to this effect. 8 6 While proponents of State
responsibility pointed to support for this principle in the 1983
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, opponents argued that the ICC was designed to
deal specifically with issues of individual criminal responsibility.187
Thus, the Rome Statute allows only for the provision of
181. Adrian Di Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case Concerning
Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence? 2 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 25,
39 (2006).
182. Id. at 40.
183. Id.
184. Bassiouni, supra note 63, at 225.
185. Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparation to Victims, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 267-69, (Roy Lee ed.,1999). See
also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 7, at 168.
186. Muttukumaru, supra note 185, at 267-68.
187. Id. at 268.
[Vol. 33:2
An Emerging Norm
reparations by the perpetrators themselves, or through a trust
fund.188 The ICC has the authority to order reparations on an
individual or collective basis, depending on its determination of
"the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in
respect of, victims." 189 It may engage in such an assessment upon
the request of a victim, or on its own motion, in exceptional
circumstances.190 The ICC may "make an order directly against a
convicted person specifying appropriate reparations." 191 The ICC
may not, however, order a State to make reparations, although it can
request the cooperation of a State party in identifying, tracing, and
freezing the proceeds, profits, and assets of crimes, and in carrying
out fines and forfeiture orders.1 92
The ICC may also "order that an award for reparations against
a convicted person be made through the Trust Fund" in cases where
"the number of the victims and the scope, forms and modalities of
reparations makes a collective award more appropriate."193 The
Rome Statute requires States to establish a trust fund "for the benefit
of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and of the
families of such victims." 194 The trust fund is funded through assets
confiscated from perpetrators. 195 The ICC will likely draw upon the
victims' trust fund more frequently than not when ordering
reparations. Often individual perpetrators are indigent, or have
sheltered their money in foreign bank accounts. Moreover, because
all of the ICC's cases, as of this writing, involve mass atrocities,
perpetrators most likely will not have sufficient assets to provide
188. Rome Statute of the Int'l Criminal Court, art. 75(1), (2) [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. For a detailed analysis of the ICC's reparations scheme see Peter G.
Fischer, The Victims' Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court - Formation of a
Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 187 (2003).
189. Rome Statute, at art. 75(1). For a detailed analysis of the provision of
reparations through individualized, case-by-case civil litigation, as opposed to
collective, reparations programs, see Marieke Wierda & Pablo de Greiff,, Reparations
and the International Criminal Court: A Prospective Role for the Trust Fund for Victims,
INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUsT. (2004), available at http://www.vrwg.org/
Publications/02/ICTJ %20Trust%2OFund%2OPaper.pdf.
190. See Int'l Crim. Ct., R. of Procedure and Evid., 94, 95, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000).
191. Rome Statute, at art. 75(2).
192. Id. at arts. 93(k), 109.
193. Int'l Crim. Ct., R. of Procedure and Evid., 98(3).
194. Rome Statute, at art. 79.
195. Id.
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victims with meaningful reparations.196
The ICC's trust fund is likely to play a role similar to that of
national reparations programs created after mass atrocities, and
both are likely to face some of the same challenges. Given that the
ICC's situations have, thus far, involved victims numbering in the
hundreds of thousands (if not millions), the trust fund, like many
transitional governments with limited budgets, will be greatly
pressed by the need to raise enough funds for all of its situations. 197
Because the Victims Trust Fund will serve as an important
alternative source for reparations, beyond the funds recovered from
perpetrators, it is likely to "face significant challenges in building up
a sufficient pool of resources to satisfy future reparations
awards." 198 Despite these likely challenges, however, the manner in
which the ICC designs collective reparations programs may
ultimately influence the development of national reparations
programs.199 Thus, although the ICC's reparations scheme does not
contribute directly to the development of the emerging norm of
State responsibility for the provision of reparations, the fund itself
may play an unusual role in shaping the development of national
reparations programs.
II. Conclusion
As non-State actors have played increasingly prominent roles in
armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War, State practice with
respect to reparations has begun to develop accordingly. By
adopting the recommendations of their truth and reconciliation
commissions on the creation of reparations programs, Peru and
Sierra Leone have accepted their responsibility to provide
reparations for violations committed by non-State actors during
their respective armed conflicts. In their articulations of this
obligation, these commissions drew on relatively long-standing
international human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR, and on the
1989 Veldsquez Rodriguez case, which provides especially strong legal
support on this issue. The TRC reports accepted by these States may
represent a shift away from the weak stances espoused by States in
196. Di Giovanni, supra note 181, at 49.
197. Id. at 50.
198. Id. at 49.
199. Id.
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the Basic Principles.
Yet this body of State practice is admittedly small and tenuous.
In light of the poor implementation records of both Peru and Sierra
Leone, it could be argued that these States have barely contributed
to State practice on the duty of States to provide reparations for the
violations of non-State actors in certain circumstances. In fact, their
failure to implement reparations programs in a timely and
meaningful manner could point to the current weakness of this
norm in light of the often complicated politics of post-conflict States
(particularly with respect to the allocation of the State budget). In
addition, the contours of this norm have not yet been fully outlined,
as little guidance exists on the exact circumstances in which this
norm applies. Despite its current weakness and its blurry contours,
this emerging norm may nonetheless play an important role in the
design of future reparations programs, which will continue to
feature in the world's many post-conflict societies.
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